Bhopal

The Bhopal Gas Leak

Introduction: Union Carbide and Bhopal

The ruins of the Union Carbide plant still loom over the slums of Bhopal, India nearly three decades after the horrific events that occurred on the night of December 2nd, 1984. The skeletal frame of the factory stands as a grim reminder of the gas leak that killed an estimated 8000 people overnight, and consequently contributed to the deaths or chronic health problems of possibly hundreds of thousands more (Broughton, 2005). While there is no doubt that the deaths associated with the world’s worst industrial disaster were a direct result of the inhalation of methyl isocyanate gas (MIC), there was perhaps a more insidious poison at work that night––exploitation of an impoverished, disadvantaged people reinforced by class inequality and the caste system of India.
     When, in 1979, multinational corporation Union Carbide opened their pesticide plant in Bhopal, the company was welcomed with open arms. The jobs that the plant would provide were difficult to pass up for the impoverished people of Bhopal. Further, Union Carbide’s business model was a beneficial one for the people of Bhopal and the company itself. Union Carbide would produce the “miracle pesticide” Sevin and the impoverished primary sector farmers of India would purchase and use the product, increasing their crop yield and profit. Union Carbide could make millions, while the farmers of India could feed millions. Additionally, the factory offered the best wages in a town where work was difficult to find. Everyone would win.

However, by 1984, drought was widespread in India, making it impossible for the financially suffering Indian farmers to afford Union Carbide’s product. Over the course of 4 years, the plant in Bhopal had become a tremendous financial liability. In an effort to cut costs, an entire third of the workforce at the plant (including half of the supervisory team) was fired, resulting in essential safety systems being scaled back. This corporate penny pinching would ultimately set off a chain reaction of irresponsibility that led to the deaths of thousands of Indian people.

Making Matters Worse: Internal Colonialism and the Caste System

In an exploration of how social inequality magnified the tragedy of the Bhopal gas leak, it is important to consider how the caste system in India affected the people that lived near, or worked in, the Union Carbide plant. Applying Robert Blauner’s model of internal colonialism (Sernau 2014, Chap. 5), we can see how the exploitation of a disadvantaged internal population resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands. When an entire population, such as the “untouchables” in the Indian caste system, are denied basic participation in their government, restricted in their freedom of movement, subjected to colonial-style labor exploitation, and basically regarded as inferior, their chances for upward social mobility are severely limited (Sernau 2014, Chap. 5). Such conditions of social reproduction leads to situations exactly like the one in Bhopal. With institutional oppression like the caste system, employment options are few. Indeed, there is little question as to the motives of a multinational corporation choosing to operate in a densely populated area like Bhopal, instead of building in a relatively uninhabited (and far safer) area. The potential for exploitation of cheap labor, infrastructure, and profit proved too difficult for them to pass up. Further, the Indian government, eager to become major players on the world’s economic stage, had extremely relaxed zoning and environmental regulations making Bhopal an attractive operations site (Malini, 2005).

Illustrative of the concept of spatial inequality (Lecture, 11/7/2013), consider that in 1984, there were 20,000 people living directly under the shadow of the Union Carbide plant (One Night in Bhopal 2004). Resource inequality results in people living in shanty towns and the surrounding “Old City”. These were people living in abject poverty, most surviving on less than $1 dollar a day. Conversely, the Americans that were employed at Union Carbide (and the Indian supervisory and administrative staff) had access to special advance warning plans and resources that the dwellers of the shanty towns did not. This divide further served to seal the fates of those that died that night. 

The Worst Plan is No Plan At All: How Union Carbide and Local Authorities Failed

There were a number of safety measures that failed that night. They were simple safeguards that, if operable, would have averted the world’s worst industrial disaster. First, a refrigeration unit that was turned off would have kept the MIC from overheating and forming into a gas. Additionally, as the gas leak began, an alarm that would have alerted the people living in the area of the impending danger, was manually disabled––to prevent panic. Finally, a flare tower could have burned off the deadly gas before it drifted into the slums––if it had been in operation (One Night in Bhopal, 2004).

As it became clear that the gas cloud was spreading into the shantytown, Union Carbide did nothing. No call was made to the local authorities. Even if a simple phone call would have been made, it probably would not have helped. There had been no precautions taken, or provisions made, for such a catastrophic event. In Union Carbide’s corporate egotism, they were sure that their technology was sound, while rendering it useless by switching the power off. 

A basic emergency response plan would have saved thousands of lives, but there was nothing like that in place. According to a staff doctor, who resigned after her many warnings to Union Carbide officials of the potential catastrophe were ignored, the company showed no concern for the impoverished population of Bhopal (One Night in Bhopal, 2004). As the poisonous gas drifted into the shantytown, people began to suffocate by the hundreds. Children were affected first, as the gas (which was heavier than air) settled closer to the ground. As people began to run away from the affected area, several hundred more were killed in the stampede. When the poison cloud had dissipated in the morning, thousands had died. The official number was difficult to ascertain, due to the poor social infrastructure. Today, it is generally agreed that the loss of life was near 3800 people during the night of the leak. However, it is estimated that 16,000 additional deaths have occurred as a result of the gas leak in the decades that followed (Broughton, 2005).

Most of these deaths could have been avoided. According to medical officials in Bhopal, a few simple steps could have been taken to prevent the catastrophe (One Night in Bhopal, 2004). An alarm could have alerted the people, and awakened them from sleep. A few extra minutes would likely have made a significant difference. Wet blankets hung over doors and windows would have lessened the impact of the gas. Finally, if people would have been told to stay indoors, or alternatively, to flee in the opposite direction of the wind, the loss of life would have been significantly reduced.

Aftermath: A Legacy of Death and Denial

In the first days following the gas leak, Union Carbide officials denied the impact of it’s system malfunction and the MIC gas. Company doctors said that the conditions of the survivors would improve with treatment, and that the environmental impact would be limited (One Night in Bhopal, 2004). Warren Anderson, the CEO of Union Carbide in India, was arrested for manslaughter, but through intervention of the United States government, was released on bail the same day. He fled to the United States, and has never admitted culpability for the tragedy (Broughton, 2005).

In Bhopal today, there is a disproportionate incidence of skin, lung, and gastrointestinal cancer. Additionally, the rates of miscarriage in women are seven times that of other populations in India. Genetic birth defects in the children of Bhopal manifest as poor coordination, blindness, memory loss, and impaired immune systems. It is estimated that 500,000 people have been affected by the tragedy (Broughton, 2005). Generations have been left crippled by illness, leaving them unable to work, further compromising their social mobility.

In 2010, seven former Union Carbide officials were found guilty and sentenced to two years in prison and ordered to pay $2000 in fines. Additionally, the population of affected people in Bhopal were awarded the equivalent of $2200 each. Dow Chemical, the parent company of Union Carbide, claims that they have learned important safety lessons as a result of the disaster in Bhopal.

It is clear that the Bhopal disaster was the product of a capitalist, corporatist system which puts profit before human life by exploiting global inequality. As the tide has slowly changed in our own country, corporate interests must seek to improve their profit margins by setting up shop in developing countries that are hungry for American dollars. Unfortunately, the people of such industrializing countries rarely benefit. More often, the presence of a multinational corporation causes more trouble than it’s worth. Sadly, in the case of Bhopal, the cost is a lasting debt of death and illness.

Works Cited

Broughton, Edward. "The Bhopal Disaster and Its Aftermath: A Review." Environmental Health. N.p., 10 May 2005. Web. 30 Nov. 2013. <http://www.ehjournal.net/content/4/1/6>.

Malini, Nair. "Bhopal Gas Tragedy - A Social, Economic, Legal, and Environmental Analysis." Texas A&M, 10 Dec. 2005. Web. <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/37856/1/>.

One Night in Bhopal. BBC, 2004.

Sernau, Scott, and Scott Sernau. "Chapter 5." Social Inequality in a Global Age. Los Angeles: SAGE/Pine Forge, 2011. N. pag. Print.